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ABSTRACT

A preliminary study investigating the perceptions of intergroup relations in the bargaining process supports Kenneth Burke's concepts of order and mystery. Questionnaires, interviews, and direct observations of teachers' and school boards' teams involved in contract negotiations show that people closest to the bargaining saw more order in the process than did those further away. Teachers with previous experience in negotiating, for example, were more aware of the complexity and multiple levels involved in reaching a settlement. They differentiated between their role and the greater control exerted by team leaders and professional negotiators. Experienced teachers, unlike inexperienced ones, also saw their own operations as more mysterious than the school board's. An apparent contradiction of Burke's idea that those closest to the process see it as less mysterious, this finding might reflect the experienced teachers' greater awareness of the secret meetings conducted by their own team leaders. While earlier research focused on the dyadic relationship in bargaining, this study suggests that intragroup and intergroup relations have a significant effect on reaching a settlement. (MM)

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ORDER AND MYSTERY IN NEGOTIATION GROUPS

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ABSTRACT

This paper illustrates two main issues in the study of negotiations. First, negotiation is viewed as a form of intergroup conflict and intragroup communication rather than a dyadic activity. Second, levels of intergroup communication create an aura of order and mystery that surrounds the negotiation process. This study tests perceptions of Kenneth Burke's concepts order and mystery as they impact on communication within and between teacher and schoolboard negotiation groups.

ORDER AND MYSTERY IN NEGOTIATION GROUPS

Formal negotiations are becoming a popular form of decision making and conflict management in organizations. The popularity of this process has spread to the public sector where teachers, police, firemen, state employees engage in an annual ritual of discussing salaries and fringe benefits. But negotiations extend beyond monetary items into the arena of working conditions and power distribution. Herein lie many of the problems that lead to stalemates, walkouts, and other signs of friction between management and public employees.

An increase in the number of Public Employee Bargaining Acts and a concomitant decrease in public teachers' salaries have led to a rapid rise in teacher bargaining groups. This paper presents data from an extensive study of two teachers' bargaining groups. The full-scale investigation entails over 130 hours of observing bargaining sessions, planning meetings, and caucus activities. In addition, it includes interviews with over 50 teachers and administrators and survey questionnaires from approximately 400 respondents. This paper, however, centers on only a portion of this data base. In particular, it focuses on one teacher-schoolboard bargaining session and on the survey questionnaires and interviews that test perceptions of order and mystery that surround the bargaining process. In this particular case, the negotiators reached a settlement on a 25-page contract within a 12-hour period. Both participants and outside observers deemed the bargaining session successful. Survey results indi-

cated that 76% of the teachers were satisfied with the settlement. Compared with previous contracts, 40% of the respondents were far more satisfied this year than in the past, while 48% felt their satisfication was about the same. Only 2% of the teachers indicated general dissatisfaction with the settlement. Healthy bargaining relationships that existed between the school board, the administration, and the teachers, in addition to the multiple levels involved in the bargaining activity made this case particularly appealing for examining the degrees of mystery and order in this process.

NEGOTIATION AS INTRA- AND INTERGROUP PROCESSES

The present study stems from the belief that bargaining is a form of intergroup conflict and intragroup relations. This perspective is more applicable to the study of bargaining in an organizational context than are the dyadic models that pervade social science research. In the organizational setting, bargaining grows out of the work relationships and communication patterns that occur on a daily basis. Hence, while bargaining is clearly a ritualistic event, it is also an ongoing process, one defined by the intra- and intergroup relationships that evolve over time.

Bargaining, then, can be defined as "a process whereby two or more parties attempt to settle what each shall give and take or perform and receive, in a transaction between them" (Rubin & Brown, 1975, p. 2). We would, however, add to this definition that it is an intergroup process, one defined by an interdependent relationship between team members, bargainers, constituents,

and opposing sides. Bargainers must cooperate to reach a joint agreement, but they must also function as mediators and communication facilitators within their own teams (Walton & McKersie, 1965). Furthermore, team members must maintain effective group relationships in order to persuade their constitutents to adopt the negotiated package and to perform their organizational roles once they leave the bargaining table. Since bargaining is an annual event, the end of one negotiation sets the stage for further sessions.

Previous research in the area of communication and negotiations has frequently followed the tenets of game theory. This research has traditionally employed laboratory studies of mixed-motive games in which the players make strategic choices that are restricted by the structure and payoffs of the game. Most games limit the alternatives to competitive and cooperative moves; players in some instances, create new outcomes, but only within the laboratory and game theory context (Steinfatt & Miller, 1974).

The dynamic nature of the bargaining process is lost in this model. Participants are viewed as rational, intentional players who always aim to maximize their gains and minimize their losses through their tactics and outcomes. Game theory capitalizes on outcomes as predictors of goals and strategies, while it eludes the complex process by which bargainers make choices. Proposals and counterproposals evolve not only through interaction at the table but also through communication within and between bargaining teams. Game theory, then, can be criticized for its emphasis on the dyadic nature of bargaining. In actuality, negotiated settlements are reached through a complex and variable

pattern of intra- and intergroup communication.

Interaction analysis of bargaining sessions also suffer from a narrow focus on dyadic negotiations. This approach, however, has contributed greatly to our understanding of the microscopic communicative strategies in bargaining transactions (Putnam & Jones, 1982a; 1982b; Donohue, 1980). It, nevertheless, considers only the actual bargaining event that occurs between two people. Bargaining entails factors in addition to the strategic choices of interdependent individuals and microscopic communicative behaviors that they exchange.

BARGAINING AND ORGANIZATIONAL GROUPS

Bargaining entails the development and maintenance of intergroup relationships. As Putnam (1982) contends, groups in organizations differ from groups in isolated settings because of their embeddedness, their sharing of members, and their association with levels of a hierarchical structure. Negotiation groups are embedded in one another. The bargaining team is a subgroup of constituent members. This team must develop norms and roles that characterize any problem-solving groups. In like manner, administrators who serve on the board's team belong to subgroups of principles, superintendents, and committees within the organization.

On both sides, the members of bargaining groups are clearly representatives for larger subgroups within the organization. Moreover, team members belong to other groups within the organization, e. g., they may serve on an in-service task force, a grading committee, or a grievance group. Administrators may

serve with teachers on these specialize ad hoc committees. Through multiple membership of individuals, team members often experience divided loyalties between their respective groups. In addition, bargaining groups are hierarchically structured, both vertically and horizontally. At the organizational level, the administrative team represents management, with all the policy-making rights that accompany this level. In another sense, the bargaining process itself represents levels in that groups are nested in one another, closer to or further from the decisions that lead to a settlement. For example, the interpersonal relationship between the two bargainers forms one level which is removed from the links between bargainers and their teams. The relationship between the respective teams constitutes another level that is even further removed from links between team members and their constituent groups.

Adams (1976) offers a model that treats bargaining as a boundary system, linking two groups together. Members of the boundary system exist in a special relationship because they are charged to represent the interest of their own groups, yet they are heavily influenced by each other. This representative function frequently reverses in that they are forced to represent the opposing group to their constituents. Hence, they act as reciprocal influence agents--influencing and being influenced by both their counterparts in the boundary system and by their own constituents.

Adams (1976) delineates variables that impinge on boundary system interaction, ones that must be comprise bargaining

elements. In particular, he lists norms sent from the constituents, visibility of the bargainer vis-a-vis his or her constituents, opponent behavior, expectations of future relationship, the present effectiveness of the organization, degree of consensus within the constituent group, time pressures to complete the bargaining, bargainers' sense of attractiveness toward the organization, control, trust, and relative power. Adams contends that these variables are interlocked in causal loops. For example, if the bargainer is mistrusted, he is likely to be monitored closely by his organization. This surveillance, in turn, causes a loss in his or her latitude to optimize and creates a tough stance that leads to lower outcomes for the organization over the long run. Adams' perspective is far more complex and realistic than dyadic models of negotiation.

Tompkins (1982) extends Adams' model by combining it conceptually with Likert's notion of linking pins. In his model, Tompkins shows the influence between groups to be both mutual and multidirectional. The boundary role system, in his view, is tied to the hierarchy of the respective groups. From this model, it appears that the dynamics within each group and the relationships between groups are critical components of the bargaining process. Bargaining, then, necessarily involves an intergroup perspective.

Walton and McKersie (1965) specify subprocesses that apply to this intra- and intergroup model of bargaining. Specifically, integrative and distributive subprocesses serve to facilitate content issues, while relationships are defined and redefined through attitudinal structuring. Intraorganizational subprocesses refer to the relationships between bargainers and their

respective teams as well as the interaction among team members. The consequences of each bargaining act are multiple and impact on all of the subprocesses. The subprocesses, in turn, occur simultaneously; they are ever-changing and they can work against each other. Walton and McKersie (1965) place bargainers in the center of this group process. Negotiators choose bargaining strategies through the need to balance subprocesses. But even though the bargainers are central to the process, intragroup relations influence their decisions.

In like manner, Carlisle and Leary (1981) observe that groups function as both a determinant and a vehicle of the negotiation process. Groups are composed of key individuals who come together to voice interests, to ensure that their influence is fully exerted during decision making, and to add skills, understanding, and technical expertise. These groups also represent outside reference groups. The boundary system for Carlisle and Leary, then, includes the negotiation team, the actual bargainers, the internal teams, the constitutuent groups, and finally, reference groups, outside the organization. Reference groups for the teachers include the union and other teacher affiliations, whereas reference groups for the administration consist of the community and neighboring school districts. They contend that an adequate conceptualization of bargaining must include interorganizational influences.

But the <u>r'aison d'tre</u> for bargaining is the constitutent groups and their representative teams. Carlisle and Leary (1981) claim that the most successful negotiations are conducted through

the team process, rather than through individual bargainers (p. 169). Teams are advantageous because their members furnish diverse areas of expertise; they spell out the implications of ideas that emerge in the process; they aid in the management of information and arguments; they encourage their sides to take risks that will move the bargaining forward; and finally, they review the bargaining interaction collectively and make suggestions for improving the process. The group role is critical to the bargaining exchange in that the process is so complex that one person cannot realistically keep track of it.

ORDER, MYSTERY, AND NEGOTIATION

Kenneth Burke (1969) offers two concepts that aid in understanding perceptions of the relationships among and between negotiation groups. He suggests that wherever a differentiation in groups occurs, mystery and order are inevitable outcomes. Differentiation, then, creates distance or an awareness of differences between groups. Moreover, this division is characterized by a concomitant feeling of mystery and order.

Previous research on conflict and identification incorporates Burke's concepts of mystery and order. Tompkins, Fisher, Infante, and Tompkins (1974) employ the concepts of identification, mystery, and order to examine attitudes toward conflict in the university hierarchy. They focus specifically on Burke's notion that members of an organization associate the hierarchy with degrees of mystery and order. Burke posits that order and mystery work together in that an ordered hierarchy is also more mysterious. Moreover, members who perceive high degrees of

mystery and order are less likely to engage in conflict and are less favorable toward organizational conflict than those who see less mystery. Tests of these hypotheses were not statistically significant, but were in the expected direction.

In another article, Tompkins, Fisher, Infante, and Tompkins (1975) examine mystery and order as they relate to identification within the hierarchy. Burke (1969) suggests that humans are inevitably ordered in their social systems because of man's ability to conceptualize categories through language and because of man's abilities to use tools that allow for division of labor. Division of labor creates status differentiations that are inevitably linked to rights and privileges. The ordered distance inevitable in differentiation also carries a sense of mystery. Those distant from one another feel a sense of mystery about each other. Mystery, however, is beneficial in that it induces cooperative action among otherwise diverse roles in the hierarchy. Tompkins et al. (1975), quoting Burke (1969), presents this explanation of mystery: "mystery arises at that point where different kinds of beings are in communciation. In mystery there must be strangeness; but the estranged must also be thought of as in some way capable of communion" (p. 115). Taken together, these concepts suggest that organizational members exist in a condition of "ordered estrangement" (Tompkins et al., 1975). The results of their study indicate that people identify most strongly with the hierarchical level closest to their own positions. They also perceive more mystery in the higher than in the lower levels. The pattern for order, however, is not consistent.

OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

The present study examines perceptions that members of differentiated bargaining groups have of themselves, each other, and the process. Based on Burke's theory, the people closest to the process should perceive less mystery than those further from the interaction. Moreover, those people closest to the process should also perceive more order than those who are more distant. Based on these assumptions we pose the following questions:

Q_1: Do people who are closer to the process perceive different degrees of mystery than do those who are not as close?

Q_2: Do people who are closer to the process perceive different degrees of order than do those who are not as close?

The bargaining groups in this study are similar to those discussed in the literature review. Differentiation, then, is represented in the distance of groups from the center of the bargaining process. The closest group, consists of the two professional bargainers who represent either the teachers' or the school board's team. The teachers' negotiator also functions as a regional director for the state association. The board's negotiator is a self-employed bargainer, who is hired by administrative teams throughout the state. On the second level are the bargainers' interactions with their team members. The third level consists of the team members, who are representatives for their constituent groups. The eleven members of the teachers' team cross six schools in the district--three from the high

school, three from the middle school, and five from the four elementary schools. The board's team is comprised of the five board members and three administrators, including the superintendent. The fourth level consists of the constituent groups--the 155 teachers in the district and the community at large.

For this study, teachers who had served on past bargaining teams were also considered to be part of the third level in that they had insights on the actual negotiation process. Those teachers who had never participated as team members were treated as being distant from the process. The bargaining episode included the events that took place prior to and following the actual bargaining as well as the process itself. Each team met in a pre-bargaining session. The actual process took place during a single 12-hour session that consisted of four caucus meetings interspersed between a formal opening and final session. In addition, the bargainers met in private without their team members on three separate occasions that lasted from 30 minutes to 1 1/2 hours. Finally, a post-bargaining ratification meeting was held by the teachers.

METHODS

Subjects

Subjects for this portion of the study were 75 teachers in a small school district. The respondents included 40 teachers from the four elementary schools, 12 from the middle school, and 23 from the high school. Thirty-one of the teachers had served on a bargaining team, either currently or in the past.

Procedures

This study employed the triangulation (Jick, 1979) of three methods: questionnaires, interviews, and nonparticipant observation. A survey was distributed to the 155 teachers. Of this group, 75 or 51% of them returned the questionnaire. The survey included items on information about the bargaining, teacher's reactions to it, and degrees of perceived mystery and order.

Mystery and order were assessed through the use of a 7-point bipolar, semantic differential scale developed by Tompkins et al. (1975). Tompkins et al. (1975) derived these scales from factor analysis of a larger set of items. The bipolar items used to measure mystery were: (1) invisible-visible and (2) secret-public. The items used to measure order were : (1) organized-unorganized, (2) ordered-unordered, (3) arranged-unarranged, and (4) structured-unstructured. Three of the items were presented in reverse order to counter response bias.

Scale analysis consisted of interitem correlations within and across each scale and Cronbach's alpha to assess internal reliability of the scales. Correlations of the items within each scale ranged from .52 to .78, with a mean of .67. Alpha reliabilities on the order scale were computed for each target. Similar reliabilities were computed on the mystery scale for each target. Reliabilities for order ranged from .70 to .86 and for mystery from .67 to .84.

Burke's notion of differentiation was operationalized on the questionnaire through perceptions of order and mystery with respect to the bargaining process itself, the board's negotiating

team, and the teacher's negotiating team. The bargaining process was defined as interactions between the two negotiators. Interviews were conducted with 23 people following the bargaining. These interviews consisted of 45 to 60 minutes with 15 teachers (10 of whom were members of the team), two administrators, four board members, and the two professional bargainers. The interviews probed how the settlement was reached, what communication occurred among team members and among other constitutents before and after the bargaining, how individuals viewed their own team, the other team, the administration, and the history of bargaining in this school district.

Finally, three researchers observed the bargaining event and took shorthand field notes of the verbatim talk. These notes were expanded and transcribed shortly after the bargaining session. Prior to the bargaining one researcher met with the board in their pre-negotiation session and another one met with the teachers. During the bargaining, one researcher met with the board in their caucus meetings, one with the teachers, and one observed the two negotiators in their private meetings. For sessions at the table all three negotiators took notes and consolidated their transcriptions. Through these observation, the reseachers gained first-hand knowledge of what happened during the bargaining. Issues and arguments were tracked across the nine different group meetings.

RESULTS

For this study, the independent variables were the levels of bargaining experience and the distant- close targets in the bargaining process. There were two levels for experience--

current or past team member and never served on a bargaining team. The three targets were the bargaining process itself, the board's team, and the teacher's team. Two 2 x 3 ANOVAs were computed to calculate the effect of these independent variables on degrees of perceived mystery and order. There was one significant interaction effect and two main effects for order and one for mystery. Teachers who were experienced bargainers saw significantly more overall order than did the inexperienced teachers ($F=12.29$, $df=3,74$, $p=.001$). These perceptions were consistently higher than those of the inexperienced members for the bargaining process (Ex X=20.68; nonEx=16.75), for the school board (Ex X=17.71; nonEX=15.57) and for the teacher's team (Ex X=16.32; nonEx=14.70). Data analysis also yielded a main effect for target ($F=5.94$, $df=3,74$, $p=.003$). All teachers perceived more order in the bargaining process than they did in the school board and the teacher's teams (BP=18.37; SB=16.45; T=15.37).

Results for the analysis of mystery indicated a main effect for target and an interaction effect for experience and target ($F=3.14$, $df=3, 75$, $p=.04$). Teachers perceived more mystery in the process (X=7.44) than they did in the school board (X=6.17) or in the teachers team (6.83). This finding, however, was mitigated by an interaction effect between target and level of experience ($F=2.77$, $df=3, 75$, $p=.05$). The experienced teachers accounted for this interaction by seeing more mystery in the process itself (X=8.35) and in the teacher's team (7.55) than in the school board (X=5.77). The inexperienced teachers, in contrast, saw less mystery in the teachers (6.32) and more

mystery in the board (6.77).

In effect, teachers who had previous experience with bargaining perceived more order in the process, the school board, and the teacher's team than did those who had never served on a bargaining team. All teachers saw more order in the bargaining process than in the school board and teacher's team, but they saw the least amount of order in the teacher's group. Moreover, the "seasoned" members perceived more mystery in the process and in the teacher's team than did the "unseasoned" ones. The experienced folks, in contrast, saw less mystery in the school board than did the inexperienced teachers. These results paralleled the findings of previous studies. That is, members closest to the process saw more order and more mystery than did those more distant. Exceptions to these predictions were: (1) experienced teachers perceived more mystery in their own team than in the opposing group and (2) they perceived less mystery in the school board than the inexperienced teachers did.

DISCUSSION

Burke's theory suggested that teachers would perceive greater order and mystery in groups that were more distant rather than close to them. Hence, they would be expected to perceive more order and mystery in the bargaining process and the school board than in their own team. The results, for the most part, were consistent with these predictions. Teachers perceived the bargaining process, i.e., the negotiators interactions, as more mysterious and ordered than either the school board's or the teacher's teams. The communication between the two negotiators and its effect on the process existed at a higher more abstract

level than interactions among team members; hence it was more distant and less comprehensible. The findings also supported the prediction that the board team was viewed as more ordered and mysterious than was the teacher's team.

Moreover, we hypothesized that the teachers who had served on bargaining teams would be closer to the process and perceive less mystery and order than would the inexperienced teachers. In opposition to this prediction, the experienced teachers perceived more order and mystery than did the inexperienced ones on five of the six measures. In addition, the experienced teachers saw less mystery in the school board than they did in their own team.

Explanations for these results emerged from interview and observational data. The group process on the teachers' team might contribute to the perceived mystery of their own group. Observations of team interactions suggested that the board and the teachers' teams exemplified very different intragroup functions. The teachers spent most of their time talking, joking, and sharing incidents about their work life, while the leaders of the team conferred separately about the bargaining process.

Furthermore, when the professional bargainer came back into the group after his private meetings with the other negotiator, he reported the major issues that they discussed and he set forth strategies for the next meeting. The teachers paused, listened to him, but offered very little feedback about the issues or the strategies. Then he joined the two leaders of the teacher's team, who were physically removed from the group. The three of

them engaged in private conversation about bargaining issues and strategies.

The teachers' negotiator appeared to function as a gatekeeper in that he frequently made unilateral decisions and often omitted or filtered issues discussed with the other negotiator. For example, in the early stages of the bargaining, he and the teachers voiced strong support for binding arbitration. After the first meeting with the other negotiator, he returned and announced, "We ain't gonna get binding arbitration." Our field notes revealed that binding arbitration was not a topic of extensive interaction in the first meeting between the two bargainers. Hence, the teachers' negotiator had made a premature decision to trade binding arbitration for other issues. His reports to them confounded his own decisions with agreements that he had discussed with the board's bargainer. Even though the teachers' negotiator worked with the leaders of the team, he functioned primarily as a gatekeeper who filtered as well as shared information. Since the majority of the team members had very little input in the development of issues, it would suggest that they found the process and their own team mysterious.

Differences between the experienced and the inexperienced teachers uncovered additional explanations for these results. The experienced teachers received more information about the bargaining process ($t=4.11$, $df=73$, $p=.003$), than did the inexperienced teachers. But more information was linked ironically to more mystery and order. Interviews with the teachers suggested that knowledge of key events added mystery and distance to the bargaining process. First, the leaders of the bargaining team

conducted informal, somewhat secretive, meetings with the superintendent and the finance manager of the corporation. This practice began five years earlier as a way of reaching agreement on cost out figures for teachers' salaries. Both sides had the salary information, the general expenditures of the corporation, and the figures for state allocations and they compared their cost out analyses. The teachers acquired their information from the state association and compared their figures with the administration's calculations. This budgetary meeting allowed both sides to begin the negotiations with common ground on the monetary allocations. These budgetary meetings, however, added another level of distance and mystery to the process, especially for the experienced teachers who had heard about them from their team leaders.

Intergroup relations with the school board, however, were more mysterious to the inexperienced than to the experienced teachers. The experienced teachers found the school board's attitudes and issues predictable. They could name, with considerable accuracy, the board members who were sympathetic to their cause and the ones who would hold out on particular issues until other board members pressured them to give in. The inexperienced teachers, however, saw the school board removed from the process and more distant than did the experienced teachers.

Another explanation for the perceived mystery and order in the bargaining process was a practice that had developed over the past five years. Most of the actual bargaining took place between the two professional negotiators in private sessions.

Even though all teachers knew about this process, the experienced members were more aware of the impact it had on the outcome. When asked how this process worked, some of the experienced teachers noted a sense of "magic" to getting a settlement. "We don't know how he (the teachers' negotiator) does it, but he gets us a settlement--a far better one in a shorter time than we received before we began this practice."

Bargaining, through the complexity of intergroup relations, is surrounded with secrecy, order, and distance between groups and subgroups. Teachers, who had no bargaining experience, were unaware of the private meetings between leaders of both teams, the extensive time that professional bargainers spent in private sessions, and the limited role that the teachers' team had in making decisions for their side. The experienced teachers, in contrast, had first-hand knowledge of the multiple levels involved in this process. Their knowledge created a sense of distance from the event, which, in turn, appear to contribute to their perceptions of mystery and order. The more levels they saw, the more mysterious and orderly the process.

CONCLUSION

This study is a preliminary attempt to understand perceptions of intergroup relations in the bargaining process. We contend that communication in the negotiation process is best examined from the perspective of interdependent groups, ones embedded in the structure of an organization. Moreover, in the negotiation process itself, groups and subgroups become hierarchically structured, nested within one another, and differen-

tiated in their functions. This perspective provides a more comprehensive view of bargaining than the traditional dyadic models.

For this particular study, Burke's concepts of order and mystery were examined as factors that affect group differentiation within the bargaining process. The findings of this study are generally consistent with Burke's theory. Respondents perceived those elements closest to the the process as more mysterious and ordered than they saw the groups who were removed from the bargaining talk. The experienced teachers, however, provide an exception to this pattern in that they saw their own operations as more mysterious than they did the school board's role. The secrecy, gatekeeping, and creation of subgroups within their own ranks may have contributed to these perceptions. In this way the teachers added levels to the decision making, and the team became further removed from the actual process. Thus, interview data revealed that this exception to Burke's theory may indeed be consistent with it. Inexperienced teachers, in contrast, appeared to lack information about the subgroups and the additional levels of decision making. Hence, teachers who were closer to the process had more experience with the secrecy surrounding it than did individuals who knew very little about the bargaining. The experienced teachers knew that the settlements were reached in private sessions between the two negotiators, that the team had minimal input in decision making, and that the secrecy extended beyond the negotiations into the ongoing problem solving throughout the year.

Further research is needed to confirm or disconfirm these

results. Content analysis of the interviews and the interaction data will provide additional insights as to how teachers perceived their own bargainer, the other negotiator, their team leaders, and the board's team. A comparison between the interaction patterns of the two teams will provide additional data on the way they perceived each other. This exploratory study, however, suggests that differentiation occurs between and within bargaining groups. This differentiation constitutes a hierarchical structure, with individuals closest to the process prevy to the complexity and multiple levels involved in reaching a settlement. Our study of order and mystery suggests intra- and intergroup relations have a significant effect on reaching a settlement.

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